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Separate Legal Personality Explained – A New Real Entity Theory

12 minutes ago
6 min read

There are many problems with the corporation from social to sustainability. Its still dominant understanding in legal scholarship through the lens of agency and contract theory is part of it. While critique and reform agendas have been forthcoming, a more realistic, more complex model of the underlying organisation was still missing. This blog series, edited by Laura Vialon, showcases the breadth of a new private law movement in corporate law which thinks differently starting from the foundations. On the theme “An Organisational Turn in Corporate Law”, authors show us a different model of the organisation drawing on a wide range of institutionalisms and organisation theory and start to map out normative implications and policy solutions.


Eva Micheler, Travers Smith Professor of Corporate Finance Law, Merton College, University of Oxford


Keywords: Real entity theory, organisations, behaviour


Coworkers meet in a glass-walled conference room, talking around a long table with laptops, coffee cups, and camera gear.

Why does company law supply separate legal personality? A contemporary version of real entity theory offers an answer. It starts with how people behave in organisations and observes that organisations are a source of social rules that affect those working for them. Organisations are to some extent autonomous of their participants hence ‘real in their consequences’. Corporate law elevates this autonomy through separate legal personality, enabling them to be fully recognised as actors in the eyes of the law.[1] The argument proceeds in four steps.


Organisations shape behaviour

The first step of the argument is that social context causes human beings to adapt their behaviour. An academic behaves differently in a private and in a professional capacity. Even as an academic, she behaves differently with students, with colleagues, and with people unfamiliar with the sector. Her professional conduct also changes with the university or department she acts for. Individual action is informed by the processes, procedures and policies of the organisation, and by the informal cues and norms people pick up from others in the same environment.


This idea has a long pedigree. Early in the twentieth century Thorstein Veblen wrote that the individual’s conduct is ‘hedged about and directed by his habitual relations to his fellows in the group’. Empirical work confirms it. ‘Group think’ can lead individuals to disengage from their own judgement, and ‘group loyalty’ can keep members to practices that have proven ineffective (List/Pettit; Ripken; Witting).


Organisations have a structure of their own

The second step of the argument is that people develop habits. After an initial learning process, decision-making becomes to some extent automated. When we work with others, we adopt shared routines, processes and procedures and create a shared culture. Together these form organisational structure which persists. New participants join, conform to the patterns they find, and teach them to those who come after. In that sense the structure operates independently of who the participants happen to be at any one time, whether shareholders, directors, employees or others. A body of theory supports this, and empirical work points the same way.


Structure and human agency

None of this reduces people to cogs in a machine. Organisational structure coexists with individual agency, and more recent scholarship favours a mediating position. W Richard Scott observes that all action, even innovative action, is affected by existing contexts and must be channelled in light of them. Processes are also avenues for change. According to Anthony Giddens individuals are simultaneously constrained and empowered by social structures. An individual or employee dissatisfied with an internal process can agitate and use the structure to change it. Processes are a ‘two-way street’.


Real in their consequences

The third step is to explain in what sense organisations are real. We cannot see or touch them, and no physical object or person is permanently associated with them. But they are social facts. The concept originates with Émile Durkheim, who observed that modes of behaviour generalised from social interaction are external to individuals and can be studied by sociology. Richard Adelstein relying on John Searle distinguishes brute facts, such as rocks, trees, dogs and people, from social facts, which exist because there is a collective understanding that they exist. A firm fits this description. Its members intend to act as a unit rather than as individuals, and non-members reinforce this because they also treat the members as an active unit.


This social reality exists independently of whether the organisation is incorporated. Firms are not living organisms, but they are autonomous in that they persist apart from their temporary participants. They are real in their consequences, because they bring about behaviour that would not otherwise exist. This is not anthropomorphic. The historic image of directors as the brain and everyone else as limbs wrongly assumes that structure completely controls participants, and the modern account rejects it. Organisations act only through human beings.


What the law adds

The fourth step is to connect this to company law. Susan Watson and Jonathan Hardman rightly point out that a company is created through incorporation under general incorporation statutes rather than by recognition of an existing entity. That does not undermine the argument advanced here. The point made here is that the law has evolved in response to the problems that organisations pose, and that the corporate form is a legal vehicle enabling organisations to act autonomously. It is also true that companies can be used for purposes which have nothing to do with organisations. But something can be shaped by a core purpose and still have other uses. A chair’s dimensions are set by a human being sitting, yet chairs serve as ladders, as shelves for books and papers, and as beds for pets. Those uses did not shape the design.


Separate legal personality

English law developed partnership law for commercial organisations, and until 1844 joint stock companies were organised through it. This caused problems that registration resolved. Deed of settlement companies could still be established today, but they are not, because the corporate form is better able to support modern organisations. Ronald Gilson says corporate law lets a corporation become a ‘real boy’. I say corporate law lets real social entities become formal subjects of the law. Because no single object or person can always be identified as the organisation, personality gives it a permanent public manifestation and lets it continue beyond a changing body of members. Companies are also liable in tort and crime, which would be unnecessary if they were no more than aggregates. And a company must be wound up and removed from the register before its personality ends, even where it is afflicted by fraud, while a contract based on fraud is normally void.


Capacity, liability and roles

The ultra vires doctrine was abolished because it did not suit commercial organisations. Section 40 of the Companies Act 2006 lets third parties acting in good faith rely on directors’ authority. Limited liability partitions assets, so individuals can start a business without risking everything, and an organisation can keep going when its participants’ fortunes falter. The Act also assigns roles. Every company needs a shareholder and a director, who may be the same person but are distinct in law. None of this would be needed if a company only held an asset, since a trust would do.


The constitution

The constitution is a product of private action, but it derives its force from statute. Standard contract law does not apply to it. It is best understood as the foundational document of an organisation, with more in common with secondary legislation adopted by private action than with a contract. Unfair prejudice and just and equitable winding up address cases where a quasi-partnership’s understanding is not reflected in it. The Duomatic principle lets unanimous informal decisions override formal procedures, which shows company law paying attention to organisational reality.


Directors’ duties 

Duties are owed to the company, not to shareholders or other stakeholders. Section 172 asks directors to promote the ‘success of the company’ for the ‘benefit of the shareholders as a whole’ and leaves its meaning to their good faith judgement. The duty of care measures directors against a reasonably diligent person in their role, and courts expect appropriate internal control and risk management systems. Derivative claims require the court’s permission and are granted only if a hypothetical director promoting the company’s success would sue. The unfair prejudice remedy, which usually produces a buy-out, delivers accountability without interfering in corporate decision-making. Conflict rules recognise individual agency: directors must disclose interests and seek authorisation, and shareholders can ratify.


What the theory does not claim

Real entity theory does not decide how much influence shareholders or other constituencies should have. It is logically prior to that question, and it does not settle whether corporations should pursue profit. It also does not make the corporate fund irrelevant, but a fund is not a legal requirement. Companies limited by guarantee have no capital, share companies can be formed with a pound or less, and even a shelf company must have a shareholder and a director.


Real entity theory therefore gives one answer to the question of what the company is. It is a legal entity designed to let an organisation act autonomously of its participants, and company law supplies the procedures and rules that protect the integrity of that collective decision-making.


Notes


[1] Note that unincorporate association, which do not possess separate legal personality, are recognised as actors in some legal contexts but this limited recognition causes significant problems (Eva Micheler, The Purpose of Corporate Legal Personhood: Unincorporated Associations as a Natural Experiment (October 09, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=7588358 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7588358).

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